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File No.: 97294

December 7, 2012

E-FILED

Ms. Kirsten Walli  
Secretary  
Ontario Energy Board  
Suite 2700, 2300 Yonge Street (27<sup>TH</sup> Floor)  
P.O. Box 2319  
Toronto, ON  
M4P 1E4

Dear Ms. Walli,

**Re: Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited's ("THESL")  
EB-2012-0064 ; City of Toronto's Application for Interim Street Lighting Rates**

On behalf of the City, during the Technical Conference, I promised to provide a copy of Bell Canada v. Canada (CRTC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1722 ("Bell Canada Case").

The Bell Canada Case stands for the proposition that the power to issue an interim rate order to disallow amounts charged may be retroactive to the date of the application by the rate payer who claims that the rates are inappropriate. The City's application in EB-2012-0250 which has been combined for hearing with this proceeding is such an application. Applying the principle in the Bell Canada case to the City's application would allow the Board to adjust the City's street lighting rates back to the date of the City's application which is May 10, 2012.

To pinpoint the references where this principle is stated, it is on page 5, first full paragraph and on page 38, the paragraph under subheading (iii).

Yours truly,

**GARDINER ROBERTS LLP**

Ian A. Blue, Q.C.

cc. Lorraine Searles-Kelly  
Robert Hatton  
Ralph Frebald

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Bell Canada v. Canada (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission),  
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1722

**The Canadian Radio-Television and  
Telecommunications Commission**

*Appellant*

v.

**Bell Canada**

*Respondent*

and

**The Attorney General of Canada,  
the Consumers' Association of Canada,  
the Canadian Business Telecommunications  
Alliance, CNCP Telecommunications and the  
National Anti-Poverty Organization**

*Interveners*

indexed as: bell canada v. canada (canadian radio-television and telecommunications  
commission)

File No.: 20525.

1989: February 21; 1989: June 22.

Present: Lamer, Wilson, La Forest, L'Heureux-Dubé, Sopinka, Gonthier  
and Cory JJ.

on appeal from the federal court of appeal

*Administrative law -- CRTC jurisdiction -- CRTC ordering Bell Canada to grant a one-time credit to its customers -- Order to remedy imposition of interim rates approved by CRTC in 1984 and 1985 and found to be excessive in 1986 -- Whether CRTC had jurisdiction to make such an order -- Whether CRTC's interim rate order may be reviewed in a retrospective manner -- Whether CRTC's power to fix "just and reasonable" rates for Bell Canada involves the regulation of its revenues -- Railway Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. R-3, ss. 335(1), (2), (3), 340(5) -- National Transportation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-20, 52, 60, 66, 68(1).*

In March 1984, Bell Canada filed an application with the CRTC for a general rate increase. To prevent a serious deterioration in Bell Canada's financial situation while awaiting the hearing and the final decision on the merits, the CRTC granted Bell Canada an interim rate increase of 2 per cent effective January 1, 1985. The interim rate increase was calculated on the basis of financial information provided by Bell Canada. In its decision, however, the CRTC clearly expressed the intention to review this interim rate increase in its final decision on Bell Canada's application on the basis of complete financial information for the years 1985 and 1986. In 1985, given Bell Canada's improved financial situation, the CRTC ordered Bell Canada to file revised tariffs effective as of September 1, 1985. As a result of this decision, Bell Canada was forced to charge the rates effective before its application for a rate increase filed in March 1984. These new rates too were interim in nature. In October 1986, notwithstanding Bell Canada's request to withdraw its initial application for a general rate increase, the CRTC reviewed Bell Canada's financial situation and the appropriateness of its rates. The CRTC established appropriate levels of profitability for Bell Canada on the basis of its return on equity and found that, in 1985 and 1986, it had earned excess revenues for a total of \$206 million. Although Bell Canada always charged rates approved by the CRTC, the latter decided that Bell Canada could not retain these excess revenues and ordered it to distribute the excess revenues through a one-time credit to be granted to certain classes of customers. On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal quashed the

CRTC's order. This appeal is to determine (1) whether the CRTC had the legislative authority to review the revenues made by Bell Canada during the period when interim rates were in force; and (2) whether the CRTC had jurisdiction to make an order compelling Bell Canada to grant a one-time credit to its customers.

*Held:* The appeal should be allowed.

The CRTC's decisions are subject to appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal on questions of law or jurisdiction by virtue of s. 68(1) of the *National Transportation Act*. Although an appeal tribunal has the right to disagree with the lower tribunal on issues which fall within the scope of the statutory appeal, curial deference should be given to the opinion of the lower tribunal on issues which fall squarely within its area of expertise. Here, Bell Canada is challenging the CRTC's decision on a question of law and jurisdiction involving the nature of interim decisions and the extent of the powers conferred on the CRTC when it makes interim decisions. This question cannot be solved without an analysis of the procedural scheme created by the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act*. The decision impugned by Bell Canada is therefore not a decision which falls within the CRTC's area of special expertise and is pursuant to s. 68(1) subject to review in accordance with the principles governing appeals. Indeed, the CRTC was not created for the purpose of interpreting the *Railway Act* or the *National Transportation Act* but rather to ensure, amongst other duties, that telephone rates are always "just and reasonable".

The fixing of tolls and tariffs that are "just and reasonable" necessarily involves, albeit in a seemingly indirect manner, the regulation of the revenues of the regulated entity as the administrative tribunal must balance the interests of the customers with the necessity of ensuring that the regulated entity is allowed to make sufficient revenues to finance the costs of the services

it sells to the public. In fixing fair and reasonable tolls in this case, the CRTC had to take into consideration the level of revenues needed by Bell Canada.

The CRTC had the power to revisit the period during which interim rates were in force. Such power is implied in the power to make interim orders within the statutory scheme established by the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act*. It is inherent in the nature of interim orders that their effect as well as any discrepancy between the interim order and the final order may be reviewed and remedied by the final order. It is the interim nature of the order which makes it subject to further retrospective directions. The circumstances under which they are granted also explains and justifies their being, unlike final orders, subject to retrospective review and remedial orders. Interim rate orders dealing in an interlocutory manner with issues which remain to be decided in a final decision are traditionally granted for the purpose of relieving the applicant from the deleterious effects caused by the length of the proceedings. Such decisions are made in an expeditious manner on the basis of evidence which would often be insufficient for the purposes of the final decision. To hold in this case that the interim rates could not be reviewed would not only be contrary to the nature of interim orders, it would also frustrate and subvert the CRTC's order approving interim rates which clearly indicates its intention to review the rates charged for 1985 up to the date of the final decision.

There should be no concern over the financial stability of regulated utility companies where one deals with the power to revisit interim rates. The very purpose of interim rates is to allay the prospect of financial instability which can be caused by the duration of proceedings before a regulatory tribunal. The added flexibility provided by the power to make interim orders is meant to foster financial stability throughout the regulatory process. The power to revisit the period during which interim rates were in force is a necessary corollary of this power without which

interim orders made in emergency situations may cause irreparable harm and subvert the fundamental purpose of ensuring that rates are just and reasonable.

Even though Parliament has decided to adopt a positive approval regulatory scheme for the regulation of telephone rates, the added flexibility provided by the power to make interim orders indicates that the CRTC is empowered to make orders as of the date at which the initial application was made or as of the date the CRTC initiated the proceedings of its own motion. The power to make interim orders necessarily implies the power to modify in its entirety the rate structure previously established by final order. As a result, the rate review process does not begin at the date of the final hearing; instead, the rate review begins when the CRTC sets interim rates pending a final decision on the merits.

Finally, once it is decided that the CRTC has the power to revisit the period during which interim rates were in force for the purpose of ascertaining whether they were just and reasonable, it follows that it has the power to make a remedial order where, in fact, these rates were not just and reasonable. In any event, s. 340(5) of the *Railway Act* provides a sufficient statutory basis for the power to make remedial orders including an order to give a one-time credit to certain classes of customers. While the one-time credit order will not necessarily benefit the customers who were actually billed excessive rates, once it is found that the CRTC has the power to make a remedial order, the nature and extent of this order remain within its jurisdiction in the absence of any specific statutory provision on this issue.

#### **Cases Cited**

**Approved:** *Re Coseka Resources Ltd. and Saratoga Processing Co.* (1981), 126 D.L.R. (3d) 705; **referred to:** *Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp.*,

[1979] 2 S.C.R. 227; *Douglas Aircraft Co. of Canada Ltd. v. McConnell*, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 245; *Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v. Board of Governors of Olds College*, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 923; *Re Ontario Public Service Employees Union and Forer* (1985), 52 O.R. (2d) 705; *Re City of Ottawa and Ottawa Professional Firefighters' Association, Local 162* (1987), 58 O.R. (2d) 685; *Greyhound Lines of Canada Ltd. v. Canadian Human Rights Commission* (1987), 78 N.R. 192; *Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Canadian Transport Commission* (1987), 79 N.R. 13; *British Columbia Electric Railway Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of British Columbia*, [1960] S.C.R. 837; *Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. City of Edmonton*, [1929] S.C.R. 186; *City of Calgary v. Madison Natural Gas Co.* (1959), 19 D.L.R. (2d) 655; *United States v. Fulton*, 475 U.S. 657 (1986); *Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases*, 436 U.S. 631 (1978); *Regina v. Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities* (1966), 60 D.L.R. (2d) 703; *Re Eurocan Pulp & Paper Co. and British Columbia Energy Commission* (1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 727; *Nova v. Amoco Canada Petroleum Co.*, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 437.

#### **Statutes and Regulations Cited**

*CRTC Telecommunications Rules of Procedure*, SOR/79-554, Parts III, VII.

*National Energy Board Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-7, s. 64.

*National Transportation Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-20, ss. 49, 52, 60(2), 61, 66, 68(1).

*Railway Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. R-3, ss. 334 to 340.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, [1988] 1 F.C. 296, 43 D.L.R. (4th) 30, 78 N.R. 58, quashing an order of the CRTC. Appeal allowed.

*Raynold Langlois, Q.C., Greg Van Koughnett, and Luc Huppé*, for the appellant.

*Gérald R. Tremblay, Q.C., and Michel Racicot*, for the respondent.

*Graham Garton*, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.

*Janet Yale*, for the intervener the Consumer's Association of Canada.

*Kenneth G. Engelhart*, for the intervener the Canadian Business Telecommunications Alliance.

*Michael Ryan*, for the intervener CNCP Telecommunications.

*Andrew Roman* and *Robert Horwood*, for the intervener the National Anti-Poverty Organization.

*//Gonthier J.//*

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

GONTHIER J. -- The present case is an appeal against a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal which quashed one of the orders made by the appellant in Telecom Decision CRTC 86-17 ("Decision 86-17"). The impugned order compelled the respondent to distribute \$206 million in excess revenues earned in the years 1985 and 1986 through a one-time credit to be granted to certain classes of customers. The respondent does not contest the factual findings on which Decision 86-17 is based nor does it claim that this order would unduly prejudice its financial position. None of the other orders made in Decision 86-17 are challenged.

The appellant claims that the purpose of the challenged order was to provide telephone users with a remedy against interim rates which turned out to be excessive on the basis



of the findings of fact made by the appellant following a final hearing held in the summer of 1986 for the purpose of setting rates to be charged by the respondent in the years 1985 and following. These findings of fact are reported in Decision 86-17. Since this case turns on the proper characterization of the one-time credit order made in Decision 86-17, it is important to describe the procedural history of the administrative proceedings which led to the order now contested by the respondent.

#### I - The facts

On March 28, 1984, the respondent applied for a general rate increase under Part VII of the *CRTC Telecommunications Rules of Procedure*, SOR/79-554, which provides for a summary public process to deal with special applications. The respondent claimed that the Canadian Government's restraint program restricting rate increases of federally regulated utilities to 5 per cent and 6 per cent was sufficient justification to dispense with the normal procedure for general rate increase applications set out in Part III of the *CRTC Telecommunications Rules of Procedure*. In Telecom Decision CRTC 84-15, the appellant rejected this application on the ground that the respondent had failed to use the appropriate procedure set out in Part III of these rules. However, the appellant indicated that if the respondent was to suffer financial prejudice as a result of the delays involved in preparing for the more complex procedure set out in Part III, it could always apply for interim relief pending a hearing and a decision on the merits (at pp. 8-9):

The Commission recognizes that, in 1985 and beyond, in the absence of rate relief, a deterioration in the Company's financial position could occur. In this regard, if the Company should find it necessary to file an application for a general rate increase under Part III of the Rules, the Commission would be prepared to schedule a public hearing on such an application in the fall of 1985. Should Bell consider it necessary to seek rate increases to come into effect earlier in 1985 than this schedule would allow, it may of course apply for interim relief. In the event Bell were to seek such interim relief, it would be open to the Company to suggest that the Commission's traditional test for determining interim rate applications is overly restrictive in light

of the Commission hearing schedule and to put forward proposals for an alternative test for consideration. [Emphasis added.]

On September 4, 1984, the respondent filed an application for a general rate increase based on 1985 financial data which would come into effect on January 1, 1986. At the same time, the respondent applied for an interim rate increase of 3.6 per cent.

In Telecom Decision CRTC 84-28 ("Decision 84-28") rendered on December 19, 1984, the appellant set out the following policy previously adopted in Telecom Decision CRTC 80-7 with respect to the granting of interim rate increases (at pp. 8-9):

The Commission's policy concerning interim rate increases, enunciated in Decision 80-7, is as follows:

The Commission considers that, as a rule, general rate increases should only be granted following the full public process contemplated by Part III of its Telecommunications Rules of Procedure. In the absence of such a process, general rate increases should not in the Commission's view be granted, even on an interim basis, except where special circumstances can be demonstrated. Such circumstances would include lengthy delays in dealing with an application that could result in a serious deterioration in the financial condition of an applicant absent a general interim increase. [Emphasis added.]

The respondent argued that its financial situation warranted an interim rate increase and did not question the reasonableness of this policy. The appellant agreed with the respondent's submission that, in the absence of interim rate increases, it might suffer from serious financial deterioration and awarded an interim rate increase of 2 per cent. In this decision, the appellant required the respondent to prepare for a hearing to be held in the fall of 1985 for the purpose of assessing the respondent's application for a final order increasing its rates on the basis of two test years, 1985 and 1986. Decision 84-28 also states at p. 10 the reasons why the interim rate increase was set at 2 per cent:

In determining the amount of interim rate increases required under the circumstances, the Commission has taken into account the following factors:

- 1) While the company stated that an interest coverage ratio of 4.0 times is required, the Commission regards the maintenance of the coverage ratio of 3.8 times, projected by the Company for 1984, as sufficient for the purposes of this interim decision.
- 2) With regard to the level of ROE ["return on equity"], the Commission is of the view that, for 1985, and subject to review in the course of its consideration of the Company's general rate increase application in the fall of 1985, 13.7% is appropriate for determining the amount of rate increases to be permitted pursuant to this interim increase application.
- 3) With regard to the Company's 1985 expense forecasts, the Commission notes that the inflation factor used by the Company is higher than the current consensus forecast of the inflation rate for 1985 and considers that Bell's forecast of its 1985 Operating Expenses could be overestimated by approximately \$25 million.

Taking the above factors into account, the Commission has decided that an interim rate increase of 2% for all services in respect of which rate increases were requested by the Company in the interim application is appropriate at this time. This increase is expected to generate additional revenues of \$65 million from 1 January 1985 to 31 December 1985. To permit the review of the Company's 1985 revenue requirement by the Commission at the fall 1985 public hearing, Bell is directed to file its 4 June 1985 general rate increase application on the basis of two test years, 1985 and 1986. [Emphasis added.]

The reasons set out in the appellant's decision indicate that the interim rate increase was calculated on the basis of financial information provided by the respondent without placing this information under the scrutiny normally associated with hearings made under Part III of the *CRTC Telecommunications Rules of Procedure*. Furthermore, the appellant clearly expressed the intention to review this interim rate increase in its final decision on the respondent's application for a general rate increase on the basis of financial information for the years 1985 and 1986. Given the content of the appellant's final decision, it is also important to note that the 2 per cent interim rate increase was calculated on the assumption that the respondent's return on equity for 1985 should be 13.7 per cent, subject to review in the final decision.

The respondent's financial situation later improved thereby reducing the necessity to proceed with an early hearing for the purpose of obtaining a general and final rate increase. By letter dated March 20, 1985, the respondent asked for this hearing to be postponed to February 10, 1986, suggesting however that the 2 per cent interim increase be given immediate final approval. In CRTC Telecom Public Notice 1985-30 dated April 16, 1985, the appellant granted the postponement but refused to grant the final approval requested by the respondent without further investigation into this matter. The Commission added that it would monitor the respondent's financial situation on a monthly basis and ordered the filing of monthly statements (at p. 4):

In view of the improving trend in the Company's financial performance, the Commission further directs as follows:

Bell Canada is to provide to the Commission for the balance of 1985, within 30 days after the end of each month, commencing with April 1985, a full year forecast of revenues and expenses on a regulated basis for the year 1985, together with the estimated financial ratios including the projected regulated return on common equity.

The Commission will monitor the Company's financial performance during 1985, in order to determine whether any further rate action may be necessary. [Emphasis added.]

Again, the appellant clearly expressed its intention to prevent abuse of interim rate increases.

After a review of the July financial information filing ordered in CRTC Telecom Public Notice 1985-30, the appellant asked the respondent to provide reasons why the interim rate increase of 2 per cent should remain in force given its improved financial situation. The respondent was unable to convince the appellant that this interim increase remained necessary to avoid financial deterioration and was accordingly ordered to file revised tariffs effective as of September 1, 1985, at pp. 4-5 of Telecom Decision CRTC 85-18:

In view of the improving trend in Bell's financial performance, the Commission is satisfied that the company no longer needs the 2% interim increases which were awarded in Decision 84-28 in order to avoid serious financial deterioration in 1985. Accordingly, Bell is directed to file revised tariffs forthwith, with an effective date of 1 September 1985, to suspend these increases.

In arriving at its decision the Commission has estimated that, with interim rates in effect for the complete year, the company would earn an ROE ["return on equity"] of approximately 14.5% in 1985, a return well in excess of the 13.7% considered appropriate for determining the 2% interim rate increases. The Commission also projected that interest coverage would be approximately 3.9 times. This would improve on the actual 1984 coverage of 3.8 times. These estimates are not significantly different from Bell's current expectation of its 1985 results.

The Commission will make its final determination of Bell's revenue requirement for the year 1985 in the general rate proceeding currently scheduled to commence with an application to be filed on 10 February 1986. [Emphasis added.]

As a result of this decision, the respondent was forced to charge the rates effective before its application for a rate increase filed on March 28, 1984. However, even though the rates effective as of September 1, 1985, were numerically identical to the rates in force under the previous final decision prior to the interim increase, these new rates remained interim in nature. In fact, the appellant reiterated its intention to review the rates actually charged during 1985 and 1986.

On October 31, 1985, the respondent decided not to proceed with its application for a general rate increase and requested that its procedures be withdrawn. In CRTC Telecom Public Notice 1985-85, the appellant decided to review the respondent's financial situation and therefore the appropriateness of its rates notwithstanding its request to withdraw its initial application for a general rate increase (at pp. 3-4):

In light of these forecasts and the degree to which the company's rate structure is expected to be considered in separate proceedings, Bell stated that it wished to refrain from proceeding with the application scheduled to be filed on 10 February 1986. Accordingly, the company requested the withdrawal of the amended Directions on Procedure issued by the Commission in Public Notice 1985-30.

The Commission notes that the appropriate rate of return for Bell has not been reviewed in an oral hearing since the proceeding which culminated in *Bell Canada - General Increase in Rates*, Telecom Decision CRTC 81-15, 20 September 1981 (Decision 81-15). The Commission considers that, given Bell's current forecasts, it would be appropriate to review the company's cost of equity for the years 1985, 1986 and 1987 in the proceeding scheduled for 1986. Such a review would allow consideration of the changing financial and economic conditions since Decision 81-15 and the impact of Bell's corporate reorganization on its rate of return. The Commission notes that other issues arising from the reorganization would also be addressed in the 1986 proceeding. [Emphasis added.]

This interim decision indicates that the appellant wished to continue the original rate review procedure initiated by the respondent in March of 1984. Thus, the rates in force as of January 1, 1985 until the final decision now challenged by the respondent were interim rates subject to review.

The hearing which led to the final decision lasted from June 2 to July 16, 1986 and this final decision, Decision 86-17, was rendered on October 14, 1986. In this decision, the appellant first established appropriate levels of profitability for the respondent on the basis of its return on equity. The appellant then calculated the amount of excess revenues earned by the respondent in 1985 and 1986 along with the necessary reduction in forecasted revenues for 1987. It was found that the respondent had earned excess revenues of \$63 million in 1985 and \$143 million in 1986 for a total of \$206 million (at p. 93):

After making further adjustments for the compensation for temporarily transferred employees and including the regulatory treatment for non-integral subsidiary and associated companies, the Commission has determined that a revenue requirement reduction of \$234 million would provide the company with a 12.75% ROE ["return on equity"] on a regulated basis in 1987. Similarly, the Commission has determined that \$143 million is the required revenue reduction to achieve the upper end of the permissible ROE on a regulated basis in 1986, 13.25%. With respect to 1985, after making the adjustments set out in this decision, the Commission has determined that Bell earned excess revenues in the amount of \$63 million, the deduction of which would provide 13.75%, the upper end of the permissible ROE on a regulated basis.

It is important to note that the evidence and the arguments presented by the interested parties as well as interveners were carefully scrutinized by the appellant at pp. 77 to 92 of Decision 86-17. It is for all practical purposes impossible to engage in such a meticulous and painstaking analysis of all relevant facts when faced with an application for interim relief. Finally, it is also useful to note that the permissible return on equity of 13.7 per cent allowed by the appellant in its interim decision, Decision 84-28, was increased to 13.75 per cent in Decision 86-17. Thus, the appellant realized that the interim rates approved for 1985 yielded greater rates of return than initially anticipated and that the rate of return actually recorded for that year even exceeded the greater allowable rate of return fixed in the final decision, Decision 86-17. Such differences between projected and actual rates of return are common and certainly call for a high level of flexibility in the exercise of the appellant's regulatory duties.

The Commission decided that the respondent could not retain excess revenues earned on the basis of interim rates and issued the order now challenged by the respondent in order to provide a remedy for this situation. This order reads as follows, at pp. 95-96:

Concerning the excess revenues for the years 1985 and 1986, the Commission directs that the required adjustments be made by means of a one-time credit to subscribers of record, as of the date of this decision, of the following local services: residence and business individual, two-party and four-party line services; PBX trunk services; centrex lines; enhanced exchange-wide dial lines; exchange radio-telephone service; service-system service and information system access line service. The Commission directs that the credit to each subscriber be determined by pro-rating the sum of the excess revenues for 1985 and 1986 of \$206 million in relation to the subscriber's monthly recurring billing for the specified local services provided as of the date of this decision. The Commission further directs that the work necessary to implement the above directives be commenced immediately and that the billing adjustments be completed by no later than 31 January 1987. Finally, the Commission directs the company to file a report detailing the implementation of the credit by no later than 16 February 1987.

The Commission considers that 1987 excess revenues are best dealt with through rate reductions to be effective 1 January 1987. [Emphasis added.]

Although the respondent always charged rates approved by the appellant, the appellant found it necessary to make sure that its assessment of allowable revenues for 1985 and 1986 would be complied with. The appellant argues that the order now challenged by the respondent was the most efficient way of redistributing these excess revenues to the respondent's customers even though they would not necessarily be refunded to those who actually had to pay the rates in force during that period.

It is therefore obvious that the appellant only allowed interim rates to be charged after January 1, 1985 on the assumption that it would review these rates in a hearing to be held in order to deal with an application for a general rate increase. Every interim decision which led to Decision 86-17 confirmed the appellant's intention to review the interim rates at the final hearing. Finally, the interim rates were ordered for the purpose of preventing any serious deterioration in the respondent's financial situation while awaiting for a final decision on the merits. Of necessity, these interim rates were determined on the basis of incomplete evidence presented by the respondent. It cannot be said that the purpose of the interim rate increase ordered by the appellant was to serve as a temporary final decision.

## II - The Issue and the Arguments Raised by the Parties

In this Court as well as in the Federal Court of Appeal, the parties have agreed that the only issue arising out of the facts of this case is whether the appellant had jurisdiction to order the respondent to grant a one-time credit to its customers. The appellant's findings of fact, its determination with respect to the respondent's revenue requirements for 1985 and 1986 and its computation of the amount of excess revenues earned during this period are not contested by the respondent. In my opinion, this issue can be divided in two subquestions:



- 1- whether the appellant had the legislative authority to review the revenues made by the respondent during the period when interim rates were in force;
- 2- whether the appellant had jurisdiction to make an order compelling the respondent to grant a one-time credit to its customers.

The main arguments raised by the appellant can be summarized as follows:

- 1- the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act* grant the appellant the power to review the period during which a regulated entity was allowed to charge interim rates for the purpose of comparing the revenues earned during this period to the appropriate level of revenues set in the final decision;
- 2- the power to make a one-time credit order is necessarily ancillary to the power to review the period during which interim rates were charged and the appellant has jurisdiction to determine the most efficient method of providing a remedy in cases where excess revenues were made.

The main arguments raised by the respondent can be summarized as follows:

- 1- the power to set tolls and tariffs does not include the power to review and make orders with respect to the respondent's level of revenues;
- 2- the appellant has no power to make a one-time credit order with respect to revenues earned as a result of having charged rates which the respondent, by

virtue of the *Railway Act*, was obliged to charge, whether these rates were set by interim order or by a final order.

Counsel for the National Anti-Poverty Organization ("NAPO") has also argued that the appellant's decisions concerning the interpretation of statutes which grant them jurisdiction to deal with certain matters are entitled to curial deference and cannot be reviewed unless they are patently unreasonable. This argument raises the issue of the scope of review allowed by s. 68(1) of the *National Transportation Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-20, (now the *National Telecommunications Powers and Procedures Act*), and must be dealt with prior to any analysis of the relevant statutory provisions claimed to be the source of the appellant's jurisdiction to make the one-time credit order found in Decision 86-17.

The present case raises difficult questions of statutory interpretation and it will therefore be necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the *Railway Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. R-3, and the *National Transportation Act* before moving to a detailed analysis of the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal and the arguments raised by the parties.

### III - Relevant Legislative Provisions

The appellant derives its power to regulate the telephone industry from ss. 334 to 340 of the *Railway Act* ("*Provisions Governing Telegraphs and Telephones*") and from ss. 47 *et seq.* of the *National Transportation Act* ("*General Jurisdiction and Powers in Respect of Railways*"). The *Railway Act* sets out the general criteria concerning the setting of rates and tariffs to be charged by telephone utility companies whereas the *National Transportation Act* sets out the appellant's procedural powers in the context of decisions concerning, amongst other matters, telephone rates and tariffs.

Sections 335(1), 335(2) and 335(3) of the *Railway Act* (formerly ss. 320(2) and 320(3)) state the principle upon which the appellant's regulatory authority rests, namely that telephone rates and tariffs are subject to approval by the appellant, cannot be changed without its prior authorization and may be revised at any time by the appellant:

**335.** (1) Notwithstanding anything in any other Act, all telegraph and telephone tolls to be charged by a company, other than a toll for the transmission of a message intended for reception by the general public and charged by a company licensed under the *Broadcasting Act*, are subject to the approval of the Commission, and may be revised by the Commission from time to time.

(2) The company shall file with the Commission tariffs of any telegraph or telephone tolls to be charged, and the tariffs shall be in such form, size and style, and give such information, particulars and details, as the Commission by regulation or in any particular case prescribes.

(3) Except with the approval of the Commission, the company shall not charge and is not entitled to charge any telegraph or telephone toll in respect of which there is default in filing under subsection (2), or which is disallowed by the Commission ... [Emphasis added.]

The most important requirement governing the appellant's power to set telephone rates is found in s. 340(1) of the *Railway Act* which provides that all such rates must be "just and reasonable":

**340.** (1) All tolls shall be just and reasonable and shall always, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions with respect to all traffic of the same description carried over the same route, be charged equally to all persons at the same rate. [Emphasis added.]

Section 340 also prohibits discriminatory telephone rates and gives the appellant the power to suspend, postpone, or disallow a tariff of tolls which is contrary to ss. 335 to 340 and substitute a satisfactory tariff of tolls in lieu thereof.

Finally, s. 340(5) of the *Railway Act* gives the appellant the power to make orders with respect to traffic, tolls and tariffs in all matters not expressly covered by s. 340:

**340. ...**

(5) In all other matters not expressly provided for in this section, the Commission may make orders with respect to all matters relating to traffic, tolls and tariffs or any of them.

Although the power granted by s. 340(5) could be construed restrictively by the application of the *ejusdem generis* rule, I do not think that such an interpretation is warranted. Section 340(5) is but one indication of the legislator's intention to give the appellant all the powers necessary to ensure that the principle set out in s. 340(1), namely that all rates should be just and reasonable, be observed at all times.

Sections 47 *et seq.* of the *National Transportation Act* set out, from a procedural point of view, the appellant's jurisdiction with respect to the powers granted by the *Railway Act*. Section 49(1) gives the appellant jurisdiction over all complaints concerning compliance with the Act while s. 49(3) gives the appellant jurisdiction over all matters of fact or law for the purposes of the *Railway Act* and of ss. 47 *et seq.* of the *National Transportation Act*. However, s. 68(1) provides an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, with leave, on any question of law or jurisdiction and it is under this provision that the respondent has challenged Decision 86-17.

In many respects, ss. 47 *et seq.* of the *National Transportation Act* have been designed to further the policy objectives and the regulatory scheme set out in the *Railway Act* governing the approval of telephone rates and tariffs. Thus, s. 52 of the *National Transportation Act* gives the appellant the power to inquire into, hear or determine, of its own motion or upon request from

the Minister, any matter which it has the right to inquire into, hear or determine under the *Railway Act*:

**52.** The Commission may, of its own motion, or shall, on the request of the Minister, inquire into, hear and determine any matter or thing that, under this part or the *Railway Act*, it may inquire into, hear and determine upon application or complaint, and with respect thereto has the same powers as, on any application or complaint, are vested in it by this Act.

Section 52 is therefore the corollary of the appellant's power to "revise [tolls] ... from time to time" found in s. 335(1) of the *Railway Act*. Thus, the appellant has the power to review, from time to time, its own final decisions on a *proprio motu* basis. Similarly, s. 61 provides that the appellant is not bound by the wording of any complaint or application it hears and may make orders which would otherwise offend the *ultra petita* rule:

**61.** On any application made to the Commission, the Commission may make an order granting the whole or part only of the application, or may grant such further or other relief, in addition to or in substitution for that applied for, as to the Commission may seem just and proper, as fully in all respects as if the application had been for that partial, other or further relief.

By virtue of s. 60(2) of the *National Transportation Act*, the appellant also has the power to make interim orders:

**60. ...**

(2) The Commission may, instead of making an order final in the first instance, make an interim order and reserve further directions either for an adjourned hearing of the matter or for further application.

Finally, by virtue of s. 66 of the *National Transportation Act*, the appellant has the power to review any of its past decisions whether they are final or interim:

66. The Commission may review, rescind, change, alter or vary any order or decision made by it or may re-hear any application before deciding it.

It is obvious from the legislative scheme set out in the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act* that the appellant has been given broad powers for the purpose of ensuring that telephone rates and tariffs are, at all times, just and reasonable. The appellant may revise rates at any time, either of its own motion or in the context of an application made by an interested party. The appellant is not even bound by the relief sought by such applications and may make any order related thereto provided that the parties have received adequate notice of the issues to be dealt with at the hearing. Were it not for the fact that the appellant has the power to make interim orders, one might say that the appellant's powers in this area are limited only by the time it takes to process applications, prepare for hearings and analyse all the evidence. However, the appellant does have the power to make interim orders and this power must be interpreted in light of the legislator's intention to provide the appellant with flexible and versatile powers for the purpose of ensuring that telephone rates are always just and reasonable.

The question before this Court is whether the appellant has the statutory authority to make a one-time credit order for the purpose of remedying a situation where, after a final hearing dealing with the reasonableness of telephone rates charged during the years under review, it finds that interim rates in force during that period were not just and reasonable. Since there is no clear provision on this subject in the *Railway Act* or in the *National Transportation Act*, it will be necessary to determine whether this power is derived by necessary implication from the regulatory schemes set out in these statutes.

In the Federal Court of Appeal, the respondent in this Court argued that in order to find statutory authority for the power to make a one-time credit order, it was necessary to find that s. 66 (power to "review, rescind, change, alter or vary" previous decisions) or s. 60(2) (power to make interim orders) of the *National Transportation Act* provide powers to make retroactive orders. Of course, the respondent argued that these provisions did not grant such a power and the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal composed of Marceau and Pratte JJ. agreed with this argument, Hugessen J. dissenting.

Marceau J. held that the appellant in this Court only had the power to fix telephone tolls and tariffs and that it has no statutory authority to deal with excess revenues or deficiencies in revenues arising as a result of a discrepancy between the rate of return yielded from the interim rates in force prior to the final decision and the permissible rate of return fixed by this final decision. Marceau J. was of the opinion that the wording of s. 66 of the *National Transportation Act* is neutral with respect to retroactivity and that the presumption against retroactivity should therefore operate. Marceau J. added that the power to make interim orders does not carry with it the power to remedy any discrepancy between interim and final orders because the respondent could not be forced to reimburse revenues earned by charging rates approved by the appellant. Thus, according to Marceau J., the regulatory scheme set out in the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act* is prospective in nature and, in the context of such a scheme, the power to make interim orders only involves the power to make orders "for the time being".

Pratte J., who concurred in the result with Marceau J., rejected all arguments based on the retroactive nature of the powers granted by ss. 60(2) and 66 of the *National Transportation Act*. Pratte J. was of the opinion that the impugned order was not retroactive in nature since its effect was to force the respondent to grant a credit in the future rather than change the rates

charged in the past in a retroactive manner. Pratte J. then stated that if legislative authority existed for Decision 86-17, it must be found in s. 60(2) of the *National Transportation Act* which provides for "further directions" to be made at a later date following an interim decision. However, Pratte J. was of the opinion that any "further direction" must be in the nature of an order which can be made under s. 60(2) in the first place. It follows from that reasoning that if no one-time credit order can be made by interim order, no "further direction" to that effect can be made under s. 60(2). Pratte J. then agreed with Marceau J. that the respondent could not be forced to reimburse revenues made by charging rates approved by the appellant whether by interim order or by a "further direction" made in a final order.

Hugessen J. dissented on the basis that, within the statutory framework set out in the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act*, all orders whether final or interim can, by virtue of ss. 60(2) and 66 of the *National Transportation Act*, be modified by a further prospective order; thus, the proposed rule that interim orders can only be modified by a further prospective order would, in Hugessen J.'s opinion, effectively eliminate any distinction between final and interim orders and defeat the legislator's intention to provide the appellant with a distinct and independent power to make interim orders. In order to differentiate interim orders from final orders, Hugessen J. was of the opinion that the appellant in this Court must have the power to fix just and reasonable rates as of the date at which interim rates came into effect. Thus, only interim rates can be modified in a retrospective manner by a final order. Hugessen J. then stated that the interim rates in force in 1985 and 1986 must not be divided into the previous rate and the interim rate increase of 2 per cent: the resulting rate must be viewed as interim in its entirety because all the rates charged after January 1, 1985 were authorized by interim orders. Finally, Hugessen J. stated that the one-time credit order was a valid exercise of the power to set just and reasonable rates as of January 1, 1985 and that the choice of the appropriate remedy was an "'administrative matter' properly left for the Commission's determination". Hugessen J. also



noted that the appellant's order was in substance though not in form a "matter relating to tolls and tariffs" within the meaning of s. 340(5) of the *Railway Act*.

## V - Analysis

### (A) *Curial Deference Towards the Decisions of the CRTC*

NAPO argues that the appellant's decisions are entitled to "curial deference" because of their national importance and that these decisions should not be overturned unless they are patently unreasonable. NAPO cites the following cases as authority for this proposition: *Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp.*, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227 ("CUPE"); *Douglas Aircraft Co. of Canada Ltd. v. McConnell*, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 245; *Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v. Board of Governors of Olds College*, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 923; *Re Ontario Public Service Employees Union and Forer* (1985), 52 O.R. (2d) 705 (C.A.); *Re City of Ottawa and Ottawa Professional Firefighters' Association, Local 162* (1987), 58 O.R. (2d) 685 (C.A.); *Greyhound Lines of Canada Ltd. v. Canadian Human Rights Commission* (1987), 78 N.R. 192 (F.C.A.); and *Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Canadian Transport Commission* (1987), 79 N.R. 13 (F.C.A.) ("*Canadian Pacific*").

With the exception of the *Canadian Pacific* case, all these cases involved judicial review of decisions which were either protected by a privative clause or by a provision stating that no appeal lies therefrom. Where the legislator has clearly stated that the decision of an administrative tribunal is final and binding, courts of original jurisdiction cannot interfere with such decisions unless the tribunal has committed an error which goes to its jurisdiction. Thus, this Court has decided in the *CUPE* case that judicial review cannot be completely excluded by statute and that courts of original jurisdiction can always quash a decision if it is "so patently

unreasonable that its construction cannot be rationally supported by the relevant legislation and demands intervention by the court upon review" (p. 237). Decisions which are so protected are, in that sense, entitled to a non-discretionary form of deference because the legislator intended them to be final and conclusive and, in turn, this intention arises out of the desire to leave the resolution of some issues in the hands of a specialized tribunal. In the *CUPE* case, Dickson J., as he then was, described the legislator's intention as follows, at pp. 235-36:

Section 101 constitutes a clear statutory direction on the part of the Legislature that public sector labour matters be promptly and finally decided by the Board. Privative clauses of this type are typically found in labour relations legislation. The rationale for protection of a labour board's decisions within jurisdiction is straightforward and compelling. The labour board is a specialized tribunal which administers a comprehensive statute regulating labour relations. In the administration of that regime, a board is called upon not only to find facts and decide questions of law, but also to exercise its understanding of the body of jurisprudence that has developed around the collective bargaining system, as understood in Canada, and its labour relations sense acquired from accumulated experience in the area.

However, it is important to stress the fact that the decision of an administrative tribunal can only be entitled to such deference if the legislator has clearly expressed his intention to protect such decisions through the use of privative clauses or clauses which state that the decision is final and without appeal. As formulated, NAPO's argument on curial deference must therefore be rejected because it fails to recognize the basic difference between appellate review and judicial review of decisions which do not fall within the jurisdiction of the lower tribunal.

Although s. 49(3) of the *National Transportation Act* provides that the appellant has full jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters whether of law or fact for the purposes of the *Railway Act* and of Part IV of the *National Transportation Act*, the appellant's decisions are subject to appeal, with leave, to the Federal Court of Appeal on questions of law or jurisdiction by virtue of s. 68(1) which reads as follows:

68. (1) An appeal lies from the Commission to the Federal Court of Appeal on a question of law or a question of jurisdiction on leave therefor being obtained from that Court on application made within one month after the making of the order, decision, rule or regulation sought to be appealed from or within such further time as a judge of that Court under special circumstances allows, and on notice to the parties and the Commission, and on hearing such of them as appear and desire to be heard.

It is trite to say that the jurisdiction of a court on appeal is much broader than the jurisdiction of a court on judicial review. In principle, a court is entitled, on appeal, to disagree with the reasoning of the lower tribunal.

However, within the context of a statutory appeal from an administrative tribunal, additional consideration must be given to the principle of specialization of duties. Although an appeal tribunal has the right to disagree with the lower tribunal on issues which fall within the scope of the statutory appeal, curial deference should be given to the opinion of the lower tribunal on issues which fall squarely within its area of expertise. The *Canadian Pacific* case is an example of a situation where curial deference towards a decision of the Canadian Transport Commission involving the interpretation of a tariff was appropriate. The decision of the Canadian Transport Commission was appealed to a review committee and then to the Federal Court of Appeal. Urie J. held that the decision of the review committee must not be reversed unless it is unreasonable or clearly wrong, at pp. 16-17:

On the appeal from that decision to this court, the appellant advanced essentially the same grounds and arguments which it had submitted to the RTC. As to the first ground, I am of the opinion that the RTC correctly interpreted the two items from the tariff and since its view was confirmed by the Review Committee, that committee did not commit an error in construction. No useful purpose would be served by my restating the reasons of the R.T.C. for interpreting the items as they did and I respectfully adopt them as my own. This Court should not interfere with an interpretation made by bodies having the expertise of the R.T.C. and the Review Committee in an area within their jurisdiction, unless their interpretation is not reasonable or is clearly wrong. Neither situation prevails in this case. [Emphasis added.]

Although the very purpose of the review committee is to interpret the tariff and although such questions of interpretation fall within the Review Committee's area of special expertise, it does not follow that its decisions can only be reviewed if they are unreasonable. However the principle of specialization of duties justifies curial deference in such circumstances.

In this case, the respondent is challenging the appellant's decision on a question of law and jurisdiction involving the nature of interim decisions and the extent of the powers conferred on the appellant when it makes interim decisions. This question cannot be solved without an analysis of the procedural scheme created by the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act*. It is a question of law which is clearly subject to appeal under s. 68(1) of the *National Transportation Act*. It is also a question of jurisdiction because it involves an inquiry into whether the appellant had the power to make a one-time credit order.

Except as regards the choice, amongst remedies available to the appellant, of the most appropriate remedy to achieve the goal of just and reasonable rates throughout the interim period, the decision impugned by the respondent is not a decision which falls within the appellant's area of special expertise and is therefore pursuant to s. 68(1) subject to review in accordance with the principles governing appeals. Indeed, the appellant was not created for the purpose of interpreting the *Railway Act* or the *National Transportation Act* but rather to ensure, amongst other duties, that telephone rates are always just and reasonable.

(B) *The Power to Regulate Bell Canada's Revenues*

The respondent argues that the appellant only has jurisdiction to regulate tolls and tariffs and that this power does not include the power to regulate its level of revenues or its return on equity.

The fixing of tolls and tariffs that are just and reasonable necessarily involves the regulation of the revenues of the regulated entity. This has been recognized by this Court interpreting provisions similar to s. 340(1) of the *Railway Act* which prescribe that "[a]ll tolls shall be just and reasonable". In *British Columbia Electric Railway Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of British Columbia*, [1960] S.C.R. 837, Locke J. said the following about para. 16(1)(b) of the *Public Utilities Act*, R.S.B.C. 1948, c. 277, which provided that in fixing a rate the Public Utility Commission of British Columbia should take into consideration the "fair and reasonable return upon the appraised value of the property of the public utility used ... to enable the public utility to furnish the service" (at p. 848):

I do not think it is possible to define what constitutes a fair return upon the property of utilities in a manner applicable to all cases or that it is expedient to attempt to do so. It is a continuing obligation that rests upon such a utility to provide what the Commission regards as adequate service in supplying not only electricity but transportation and gas, to maintain its properties in a satisfactory state to render adequate service and to provide extensions to these services when, in the opinion of the Commission, such are necessary. In coming to its conclusion as to what constituted a fair return to be allowed to the appellant these matters as well as the undoubted fact that the earnings must be sufficient, if the company was to discharge these statutory duties, to enable it to pay reasonable dividends and attract capital, either by the sale of shares or securities, were of necessity considered. Once that decision was made it was, in my opinion, the duty of the Commission imposed by the statute to approve rates which would enable the company to earn such a return or such lesser return as it might decide to ask. [Emphasis added.]

In *Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. City of Edmonton*, [1929] S.C.R. 186, Lamont J. described the relevant factors in the determination of what are just and reasonable rates as follows (at p. 190):

In order to fix just and reasonable rates, which it was the duty of the Board to fix, the Board had to consider certain elements which must always be taken into account in fixing a rate which is fair and reasonable to the consumer and to the company. One of these is the rate base, by which is meant the amount which the Board considers the owner of the utility has invested in the enterprise and on which he is entitled to a fair return. Another is the percentage to be allowed as a fair return.

Such provisions require the administrative tribunal to balance the interests of the customers with the necessity of ensuring that the regulated entity is allowed to make sufficient revenues to finance the costs of the services it sells to the public.

Thus, it is trite to say that in fixing fair and reasonable tolls the appellant must take into consideration the level of revenues needed by the respondent. In fact, the respondent would be the first to complain if its financial situation was not taken into consideration when tolls are fixed. By so doing, the appellant regulates the respondent's revenues albeit in a seemingly indirect manner. I would therefore dismiss this argument.

*(C) The Power to Revisit the Period During Which Interim Rates Were in Force*

(i) Introduction

As indicated above, the appellant has examined the period during which interim rates were in force, i.e. from January 1, 1985 to October 14, 1986, for the purpose of ascertaining whether these interim rates were in fact just and reasonable. Following a factual finding that these rates were not just and reasonable, the one-time credit order now contested before this Court was made in order to remedy this situation. Thus, the effect of Decision 86-17 was not retroactive in nature since it does not seek to establish rates to replace or be substituted to those which were charged during that period. The one-time credit order is, however, retrospective in the sense that its purpose is to remedy the imposition of rates approved in the past and found in the final analysis to be excessive. Thus, the question before this Court is whether the appellant has jurisdiction to make orders for the purpose of remedying the inappropriateness of rates which were approved by it in a previous interim decision.

This question involves a determination of whether rates approved by interim order are inherently contingent as well as provisional or whether the statutory scheme established by the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act* is so prospective in nature that it precludes such a retrospective review of interim rates approved by the appellant. Finally, it is also necessary to determine whether the appellant has jurisdiction to order the reimbursement of amounts which exceed the revenues actually collected as a direct result of the interim rates.

(ii) The Distinction Between Interim and Final Orders

The respondent argues that the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act* establish a regulatory regime which is exclusively prospective in nature because all rates, whether interim or final, must be just and reasonable. Thus, if interim rates have been approved on the basis that they are just and reasonable, no excessive revenues can be earned by charging such rates; interim rates, by reason only of their approval by the appellant, are presumed to be just and reasonable until they are modified by a subsequent order. According to the respondent, interim orders are therefore orders made "for the time being" until a more permanent order is made.

In his dissenting reasons, Hugessen J. points out quite accurately that if interim orders are simply orders made "for the time being", it will be impossible to distinguish final orders from interim orders within the statutory scheme established by the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act* since all final orders may be revised by the appellant of its own motion and at any time: s. 335(1) of the *Railway Act* and s. 52 of the *National Transportation Act*. It is therefore impossible to say that final orders made under these statutes are final in the sense that they may never be reconsidered. The on-going nature of the appellant's regulatory activities necessarily entails a continuous review of past decisions concerning tolls and tariffs. Thus, all

orders, whether final or interim, would be orders "for the time being" within the statutory scheme established by the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act*.

Both the appellant and Hugessen J. rely heavily on *Re Coseka Resources Ltd. and Saratoga Processing Co.* (1981), 126 D.L.R. (3d) 705 (Alta. C.A.) for the proposition that interim decisions must be distinguished from final decisions in that they may be reviewed in a retrospective manner. This distinction is based on the fact that interim decisions are made subject to "further direction" as prescribed by s. 60(2) of the *National Transportation Act* which, for convenience, I cite again:

60. ...

(2) The Commission may, instead of making an order final in the first instance, make an interim order and reserve further directions either for an adjourned hearing of the matter or for further application. [Emphasis added.]

The statutory scheme analysed by the Alberta Court of Appeal in *Re Coseka* is substantially similar to though more clearly prospective than the statutory scheme established by the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act*. Furthermore, s. 52(2) of the *Public Utilities Board Act*, R.S.A. 1970, c. 302, is identical in wording to s. 60(2) of the *National Transportation Act*. Laycraft J.A., as he then was, cited with approval by Hugessen J., wrote the following with respect to the possibility of revisiting the period during which interim rates were in force for the purpose of deciding whether those interim rates were in fact just and reasonable, at pp. 717-18:

In my view, to say that an interim order may not be replaced by a final order is to attribute virtually no additional powers to the Board from s. 52 beyond those already contained in either the *Gas Utilities Act* or the *Public Utilities Board Act* to make final orders. The Board is by other provisions of the statute empowered by order to fix rates either on application or on its own motion. An interim order would be the same, and have the same effect, as a final order unless the "further direction" which the statute contemplates includes the power to change the interim order. On



that construction of the section the interim order would be a "final" order in all but name. The Board would need no further legislative authority to issue a further "final" order since it may fix rates under s. 27 on its own motion without a further application. The provision for an interim order was intended to permit rates to be fixed subject to correction to be made when the hearing is subsequently completed.

It was urged during argument that s. 52(2) was merely intended to enable the Board to achieve "rough justice" during the period of its operation until a final order is issued. However, the Board is required to fix "just and reasonable rates" not "roughly just and reasonable rates". The words "reserve for further direction", in my view, contemplate changes as soon as the Board is able to determine those just and reasonable rates. [Emphasis added.]

I agree with Hugessen J. and with the reasons of Laycraft J.A. in *Re Coseka* where he made a careful review of previous cases. The statutory scheme established by the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act* is such that one of the differences between interim and final orders must be that interim decisions may be reviewed and modified in a retrospective manner by a final decision. It is inherent in the nature of interim orders that their effect as well as any discrepancy between the interim order and the final order may be reviewed and remedied by the final order. I hasten to add that the words "further directions" do not have any magical, retrospective content. Under the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act*, final orders are subject to "further [prospective] directions" as well. It is the interim nature of the order which makes it subject to further retrospective directions.

The importance of distinguishing final orders from interim orders is illustrated by the case of *City of Calgary v. Madison Natural Gas Co.* (1959), 19 D.L.R. (2d) 655 (Alta. C.A.). In *Madison*, the Public Utility Board (the "Board") was faced with an application by the City of Calgary for the reimbursement of amounts earned in excess of the rates of return allowed in orders 34 and 41 for the sale of natural gas. The Board had allowed a rate of return of 7 per cent but, due to its lack of useful information to predict the effect of rates on the actual financial performance of the regulated entity, the rates per volume fixed by the Board actually yielded

greater profits than anticipated. The Board refused to grant the demands made in the application because it felt it had no jurisdiction to revisit periods during which rates approved in a final decision were in force. This decision was confirmed by the Court of Appeal on the basis that, contrary to arguments made by the City of Calgary, orders 34 and 41 were final orders not governed by s. 35a(3) of the *Natural Gas Utilities Act*, which read as follows:

**35a -- ...**

(3) The Board is hereby authorized, empowered and directed, on the final hearing, to give consideration to the effect of the operation of such interim or temporary order and in the final order to make, allow or provide for such adjustments, allowances or other factors, as to the Board may seem just and reasonable.

Order 34 provided that the price was set at 9 cents per mcf and that "if it should turn out that there is a surplus, it can be dealt with when the time arrives" which led to the argument that this order was in fact an interim order. Johnson J.A. dismissed this argument in the following terms, at pp. 662-63:

It is the submission of the appellants that O. 34 and O. 41 are interim or temporary orders and the Board can now deal with these surpluses in accordance with s-s (3). As I have mentioned, orders fixing interim prices were made while the Board was hearing the application and considering its report. These, of course, were superseded by the order now under consideration. Orders 34 and 41 are, of course, not final orders in the sense that judgments are final. The Act contemplates that subsequent applications will be made to change the price fixed by these orders. They are nonetheless final so far as each application is concerned.

It is useful to note that the respondent relies heavily on the *Madison* case for the proposition that a regulated entity cannot be forced to disgorge profits legally earned by charging rates approved by the relevant regulatory authority on the basis that they are just and reasonable. Since the City

of Calgary sought to obtain the reimbursement of profits earned by charging rates approved by final order, this case does not support the respondent's position.

A consideration of the nature of interim orders and the circumstances under which they are granted further explains and justifies their being, unlike final decisions, subject to retrospective review and remedial orders. The appellant may make a wide variety of interim orders dealing with hearings, notices and, in general, all matters concerning the administration of proceedings before the appellant. Such orders are obviously interim in nature. However, this is less obvious when an interim order deals with a matter which is to be dealt with in the final decision, as was the case with the interim rate increase ordered in Decision 84-28. If interim rate increases are awarded on the basis of the same criteria as those applied in the final decision, the interim decision would serve as a preliminary decision on the merits as far as the rate increase is concerned. This, however, is not the purpose of interim rate orders.

Traditionally, such interim rate orders dealing in an interlocutory manner with issues which remain to be decided in a final decision are granted for the purpose of relieving the applicant from the deleterious effects caused by the length of the proceedings. Such decisions are made in an expeditious manner on the basis of evidence which would often be insufficient for the purposes of the final decision. The fact that an order does not make any decision on the merits of an issue to be settled in a final decision and the fact that its purpose is to provide temporary relief against the deleterious effects of the duration of the proceedings are essential characteristics of an interim rate order.

In Decision 84-28, the appellant granted the respondent an interim rate increase on the basis of the following criteria which, for convenience, I cite again (at p. 9):

The Commission considers that, as a rule, general rate increases should only be granted following the full public process contemplated by Part III of its Telecommunications Rules of Procedure. In the absence of such a process, general rate increases should not in the Commission's view be granted, even on an interim basis, except where special circumstances can be demonstrated. Such circumstances would include lengthy delays in dealing with an application that could result in a serious deterioration in the financial condition of an applicant absent a general interim increase.

Decision 84-28 was truly an interim decision since it did not seek to decide in a preliminary manner an issue which would be dealt with in the final decision. Instead, the appellant granted the interim rate increase on the basis that such an increase was necessary in order to prevent the respondent from having serious financial difficulties.

Furthermore, the appellant consistently reiterated throughout the procedures which led to Decision 86-17 its intention to review the rates charged for the test year 1985 and up to the date of the final decision. Holding that the interim rates in force during that period cannot be reviewed would not only be contrary to the nature of interim orders, it would also frustrate and subvert the appellant's order approving interim rates.

It is true, as the respondent argues, that all telephone rates approved by the appellant must be just and reasonable whether these rates are approved by interim or final order; no other conclusion can be derived from s. 340(1) of the *Railway Act*. However, interim rates must be just and reasonable on the basis of the evidence filed by the applicant at the hearing or otherwise available for the interim decision. It would be useless to order a final hearing if the appellant was bound by the evidence filed at the interim hearing. Furthermore, the interim rate increase was granted on the basis that the length of the proceedings could cause a serious deterioration in the financial condition of the respondent. Only once such an emergency situation was found to exist did the appellant ask itself what rate increase would be just and reasonable on the basis of the

available evidence and for the purpose of preventing such a financial deterioration. The inherent differences between a decision made on an interim basis and a decision made on a final basis clearly justify the power to revisit the period during which interim rates were in force.

The respondent argues that the power to revisit the period during which interim rates were in force cannot exist within the statutory scheme established by the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act* because these statutes do not grant such a power explicitly, unlike s. 64 of the *National Energy Board Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-7. The powers of any administrative tribunal must of course be stated in its enabling statute but they may also exist by necessary implication from the wording of the act, its structure and its purpose. Although courts must refrain from unduly broadening the powers of such regulatory authorities through judicial law-making, they must also avoid sterilizing these powers through overly technical interpretations of enabling statutes. I have found that, within the statutory scheme established by the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act*, the power to make interim orders necessarily implies the power to revisit the period during which interim rates were in force. The fact that this power is provided explicitly in other statutes cannot modify this conclusion based as it is on the interpretation of these two statutes as a whole.

I am bolstered in my opinion by the fact that the regulatory scheme established by the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act* gives the appellant very broad procedural powers for the purpose of ensuring that telephone rates and tariffs are, at all times, just and reasonable. Within this regulatory framework, the power to make appropriate orders for the purpose of remedying interim rates which are not just and reasonable is a necessary adjunct to the power to make interim orders.

It is interesting to note that, in the context of statutory schemes which did not provide any power to set interim rates, the United States Supreme Court has held that regulatory agencies have both the power to impose interim rates and the power to make reimbursement orders where the interim rates are found to be excessive in the final order: *United States v. Fulton*, 475 U.S. 657 (1986), at pp. 669-71; *Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases*, 436 U.S. 631 (1978), where Brennan J. wrote the following comments at pp. 654-56:

Finally, petitioners contend that the Commission has no power to subject them to an obligation to account for and refund amounts collected under the interim rates in effect during the suspension period and the initial rates which would become effective at the end of such a period.... In response, we note first that we have already recognized in *Chessie* that the Commission does have powers "ancillary" to its suspension power which do not depend on an express statutory grant of authority. We had no occasion in *Chessie* to consider what the full range of such powers might be, but we did indicate that the touchstone of ancillary power was a "direct relationship" between the power asserted and the Commission's "mandate to assess the reasonableness of ... rates and to suspend them pending investigation if there is a question as to their legality." 426 U.S., at 514.

...

Thus, here as in *Chessie*, the Commission's refund conditions are a "legitimate, reasonable, and direct adjunct to the Commission's explicit statutory power to suspend rates pending investigation," in that they allow the Commission, in exercising its suspension power, to pursue "a more measured course" and to "offer" an alternative tailored far more precisely to the particular circumstances" of these cases. Since, again as in *Chessie*, the measured course adopted here is necessary to strike a proper balance between the interests of carriers and the public, we think the Interstate Commerce Act should be construed to confer on the Commission the authority to enter on this course unless language in the Act plainly requires a contrary result.

This approach to the interpretation of statutes conferring regulatory authority over rates and tariffs is only the expression of the wider rule that the court must not stifle the legislator's intention by reason only of the fact that a power has not been explicitly provided for.

The appellant has also argued that the power to "vary" a previous decision, whether interim or final, found in s. 66 of the *National Transportation Act*, includes the power to vary these decisions in a retroactive manner. Given my conclusion based on the inherent nature of interim orders, it is unnecessary for me to deal with this argument.

(iii) The Relevance of the Distinction Between Positive Approval and Negative Disallowance Schemes of Rate Regulation

Much was said in argument about the difference between positive approval schemes and negative disallowance schemes with respect to the power to act retrospectively. The first category includes schemes which provide that the administrative agency is the only body having statutory authority to approve or fix tolls payable to utility companies; these schemes generally stipulate that tolls shall be "just and reasonable" and that the administrative agency has the power to review these tolls on a *proprio motu* basis or upon application by an interested party. The second category includes schemes which grant utility companies the right to fix tolls as they wish but also grant users the right to complain before an administrative agency which has the power to vary those tolls if it finds that they are not "just and reasonable". It has generally been found that negative disallowance schemes provide the power to make orders which are retroactive to the date of the application by the ratepayer who claims that the rates are not "just and reasonable". On the other hand, positive approval schemes have been found to be exclusively prospective in nature and not to allow orders applicable to periods prior to the final decision itself. A full discussion of this issue was made by Estey J. in *Nova v. Amoco Canada Petroleum Co.*, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 437, at pp. 450-51, and I do not propose to repeat or to criticize what was said in that case with respect to the power to review rates approved by a previous final order. I am of the opinion that the regulatory scheme established by the *Railway Act* and the *National Transportation Act* is a positive approval scheme inasmuch as the respondent's rates are subject

to approval by the appellant. However, the *Nova* case only dealt with the power to review rates approved in a previous final decision and, as I have said before, entirely different considerations apply when interim rates are reviewed.

It has often been said that the power to review its own previous final decision on the fairness and the reasonableness of rates would threaten the stability of the regulated entity's financial situation. In *Regina v. Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities* (1966), 60 D.L.R. (2d) 703, Ritchie J.A., wrote the following comments on this issue, at p. 729:

The distributor contends that in the absence of any express limitation or restriction or an express provision as to the effective date of any order made by the board, the jurisdiction conferred on the board by the Legislature includes jurisdiction to make orders with retrospective effect. Reliance is placed on *Bakery and Confectionery Workers International Union of America, Local 468 v. Salmi, White Lunch Ltd. v. Labour Relations Board of British Columbia*, 56 D.L.R. (2d) 193, [1966] S.C.R. 282, 55 W.W.R. 129 which it is contended must be applied when interpreting s. 6(1) of the Act.

The clear object of the Act is to ensure stability in the operation of public utilities and the maintenance of just, reasonable and non-discriminatory rates. That object would be defeated if the board having, on November 14, 1962, made an order fixing the rates to be paid by the distributor for natural gas purchased from the producer, reduced those rates on February 19, 1966, more than three years later, and directed the reduced rates be effective as from January 1, 1962, or as from any other date prior to February 19, 1966.

and further at p. 732:

In no section of the Act do I find any wording indicating an intention on the part of the Legislature to confer on the board authority to make orders fixing rates with retrospective effect or any language requiring a construction that such authority has been bestowed on the board. To so interpret s. 6(1) would render insecure the position of not only every public utility carrying on business in the Province but also the position of every customer of such public utility.



However, Ritchie J.A.'s comments deal with the *Public Utilities Act*, R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 186, which did not provide the Board with any power to make interim orders. I readily agree that Ritchie J.A.'s concerns about the financial stability of utility companies are valid when one is faced with the argument that a Board has the power to revisit its own previous final decisions. Since no time limit could be placed on the period which could be revisited, any power to revisit previous final decisions would have to be explicitly provided in the enabling statute. Furthermore, even if final orders are "for the time being", it does not necessarily follow that they must be stripped of all their finality through the judicial recognition of a power to revisit a period during which final rates were in force.

However, there should be no concern over the financial stability of regulated utility companies where one deals with the power to revisit interim rates. The very purpose of interim rates is to allay the prospect of financial instability which can be caused by the duration of proceedings before a regulatory tribunal. In fact, in this case, the respondent asked for and was granted interim rate increases on the basis of serious apprehended financial difficulties. The added flexibility provided by the power to make interim orders is meant to foster financial stability throughout the regulatory process. The power to revisit the period during which interim rates were in force is a necessary corollary of this power without which interim orders made in emergency situations may cause irreparable harm and subvert the fundamental purpose of ensuring that rates are just and reasonable.

Even though Parliament has decided to adopt a positive approval regulatory scheme for the regulation of telephone rates, the added flexibility provided by the power to make interim orders indicates that the appellant is empowered to make orders as of the date at which the initial application was made or as of the date the appellant initiated the proceedings of its own motion. The underlying theory behind the rule that a positive approval scheme only gives jurisdiction to

make prospective orders is that the rates are presumed to be just and reasonable until they are modified because they have been approved by the regulatory authority on the basis that they were indeed just and reasonable. However, the power to make interim orders necessarily implies the power to modify in its entirety the rate structure previously established by final order. As a result, it cannot be said that the rate review process begins at the date of the final hearing; instead, the rate review begins when the appellant sets interim rates pending a final decision on the merits. As was stated in *obiter* in *Re Eurocan Pulp & Paper Co. and British Columbia Energy Commission* (1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 727 (B.C.C.A.), with respect to a similar though not identical legislative scheme, the power to make interim orders effectively implies the power to make orders effective from the date of the beginning of the proceedings. In turn, this power must comprise the power to make appropriate orders for the purpose of remedying any discrepancy between the rate of return yielded by the interim rates and the rate of return allowed in the final decision for the period during which they are in effect so as to achieve just and reasonable rates throughout that period.

(iv) The Power to Make a One-time Credit Order

Once it is decided, as I have, that the appellant does have the power to revisit the period during which interim rates were in force for the purpose of ascertaining whether they were just and reasonable, it would be absurd to hold that it has no power to make a remedial order where, in fact, these rates were not just and reasonable. I also agree with Hugessen J. that s. 340(5) of the *Railway Act* provides a sufficient statutory basis for the power to make remedial orders including an order to give a one-time credit to certain classes of customers.

CNCP Telecommunications argues that the one-time credit order should be limited to the amount of revenues actually derived as a direct result of the 2 per cent interim rate increase

and that these excess revenues should be refunded to the actual customers who paid them. The presumption behind this argument is that the portion of the interim rates corresponding to the final rates in force prior to the beginning of the proceedings cannot be held to be unjust or unreasonable until a final decision is rendered. As I have held that the appellant has jurisdiction to review the fairness and the reasonableness of these interim rates in their entirety because the rate-review process starts as of the date of the beginning of the proceedings, this argument must be dismissed.

Finally, it is true that the one-time credit ordered by the appellant will not necessarily benefit the customers who were actually billed excessive rates. However, once it is found that the appellant does have the power to make a remedial order, the nature and extent of this order remain within its jurisdiction in the absence of any specific statutory provision on this issue. The appellant admits that the use of a one-time credit is not the perfect way of reimbursing excess revenues. However, in view of the cost and the complexity of finding who actually paid excessive rates, where these persons reside and of quantifying the amount of excessive payments made by each, and having regard to the appellant's broad jurisdiction in weighing the many factors involved in apportioning respondent's revenue requirement amongst its several classes of customers to determine just and reasonable rates, the appellant's decision was eminently reasonable and I agree with Hugessen J. that it should not be overturned.

## VI - Conclusion

In my opinion, the appellant had jurisdiction to review the interim rates in force prior to Decision 86-17 for the purpose of ascertaining whether they were just and reasonable, had jurisdiction to order the respondent to grant the one-time credit described in Decision 86-17 and has committed no error in so doing.

I would allow the appeal and confirm the appellant's decision, with costs in all courts.

*Appeal allowed with costs.*

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*Solicitors for the respondent: Clarkson, Tétrault, Montréal.*

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*Solicitor for the intervener the Consumers' Association of Canada: Janet Yale, Ottawa.*

*Solicitor for the intervener Canadian Business Telecommunications Alliance: Kenneth G. Engelhart, Toronto.*

*Solicitor for the intervener the CNCP Telecommunications: Michael Ryan, Toronto.*

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